Thailand needs middle power ambition

Having participated in the recent Asean-related summit meetings in Vientiane, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and her team must now work out Thailand’s foreign policy priorities and posture. Foreign policy projection peaked around 20 years ago when Thailand was recognised as an emerging regional leader with the potential of a middle power. Since then, foreign policy has been patchy and hostage to polarisation and domestic political volatility. It is time to chart a way forward for Thailand’s international standing and role despite ongoing political conflict at home.
At its peak, Thai foreign policy pivoted around three principal pillars, namely the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation (Acmecs), and bilateral free-trade agreements. In hindsight, it was a bold and innovative platform in contrast to the traditionally reactive and passive foreign policy in the past. It was less the famous pragmatism of “bending with the wind” but more designed to set wind conditions.
It leveraged Thailand’s geographical advantages as the mainland centre of Asean and Southeast Asia’s central location on the Asian landmass, thereby underpinning the Acmecs focusing on the Mekong countries and Asia-wide ACD stretching from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East. These were complemented by more than ten bilateral FTAs with key countries in different regions, such as Chile and Peru in South America and Bahrain in the Middle East, alongside Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United States, and the European Free Trade Agreement (Efta), comprising Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Liechtenstein.
This foreign policy outlook was laid out at a time of the global war on terror following the al-Qaeda Islamist terrorism on Sept 11 against the US. It was a time when the multilateral trading system was becoming problematic, with more and more economies resorting to regional and bilateral FTAs. It was a juncture when Asean was on the rise while its leading spokesmen at the time, such as Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, were about to retire, although the latter prime minister later came back to politics. Thailand had an ambition for a higher and more prominent place in the world.
The Thai government was then under the leadership of Thaksin Shinawatra and his juggernaut, the Thai Rak Thai Party, which used its electoral dominance after January 2001 to set out such assertive foreign policy directions. Of course, Mr Thaksin and his associates were controversial and beset with conflict of interest and graft allegations, as evident in his corruption convictions and jail terms, which he accepted on returning to the country in August 2023 after 15 years in exile. Vociferous critics of Mr Thaksin’s conflict of interest and autocratic tendencies, this author included, saw in the ensuing years that his enemies and adversaries who staged military coups and judicial interventions in connivance with anti-Thaksin politicians were no better on the graft front and were so incompetent that Thailand was mismanaged to its lowest international standing.
More than 20 years later, it is hard to dispute that Thailand had its best foreign policy game and reached the pinnacle of its international profile back then. If a particular juncture had to be pinpointed, it would have been about the time when Thailand hosted the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in October 2003 and was looked upon by its regional peers and other major powers as an up-and-coming middle power, a player to be reckoned with on the global stage.
This foreign policy assertion with self-confidence was stalled and undermined in short order after Thai Rak Thai won a spectacular landslide re-election in February 2005. The country steadily declined and stagnated since, punctuated by the two coups in 2006 and 2014 and the Constitutional Court’s seemingly routine dissolutions of political parties that won elections. Foreign relations became problematic because of domestic politics. Priorities shifted to internal security and away from prosperity. Instead of seeking international prominence, Thailand had to keep making explanations and excuses for its electoral manipulation and subversion at home, not to mention the military’s suppression of anti-coup street protests in 2009-10 and again in 2020.
Few of the FTAs got through, whereas the Thai-US FTA was weaponised by anti-Thaksin columns as treason and had to be abandoned. The Australian and New Zealand FTAs got through and proved a boon for Thailand’s external trade. The Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement was kept on track and finalised after the 2006 coup. The rest of the FTA strategy was in tatters by the 2014 coup when Thailand turned inward as part of the full securitisation of the monarchy. The Thai-Efta deal is still being negotiated today and is reportedly close to completion. But what a waste of the past 20 years.
To regain its foreign policy projection and international prestige and standing, Thailand needs to get back its self-confidence and ambition. Doing so is difficult when the government is constantly being destabilised by saboteurs and spoilers who keep filing charges and petitions with the Constitutional Court after losing elections time and again.
But eventually, Thailand will need to get its foreign policy act together. When that happens, the focus should be building its middle power potential. Despite domestic divisions, no one objects to Thailand becoming a middle power. It carries a rare internal consensus the way that the Marriage Equality Act sailed through parliament with flying colours. The only major political party that espoused such a “middle power” strategy was Move Forward, which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court.
Yet the middle power idea and strategy to realise it should remain on the table. This means that the Paetongtarn government should not fall back on reviving the ACD and Acmecs out of convenience and lack of imagination. The logic and opportunity of these two platforms are no longer timely and fit for purpose. Joining the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) should be the medium- and longer-term objective. Although membership accession takes longer, the OECD’s criteria of liberalisation and openness are the kind of structural reforms Thailand requires to move forward. Indonesia has made this calculation and commitment.
If Thailand is to be part of the recently expanded Brics — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa plus new autocratic members comprising Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates — then it should stick closely with Malaysia and any other Asean member state that joins. Beyond OECD and Brics consideration, Thailand needs to get back aggressive on its FTA track and aim to complete trade deals with Efta expeditiously and with the European Union sooner rather than later.
These trade deals lead to reforms and adjustments that can take the Thai economy forward and boost foreign relations with crucial countries in the international community. Being a middle power with a pro-democracy orientation, located in mainland Southeast Asia with an unrivalled set of relations with the great powers, is where Thailand should want to be.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, on leave from Chulalongkorn University’s faculty of political science, is currently a visiting professor at the London School of Economics.